Explaining at-issueness contrasts between questions and assertions
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We highlight an insightful but hitherto unexploited minimal pair concerning presupposition and non-at-issueness, support it with judgments from the literature, and offer an explanation.

Falling disjunctive questions have been noted to imply *exclusivity* and *sufficiency*:

(1)   Was John at the party,   or Mary?
      L*H   H%   H*L   L%

- **Exclusivity:** (the speaker believes) not both were there, i.e., at most one.
- **Sufficiency:** (the speaker believes) not neither was there, i.e., at least one.

It is often claimed that what is implied here is *presupposed* (e.g., Bartels, 1999; Aloni & Égré, 2010; Biezma & Rawlins, 2012). This contrasts with disjunctive assertions, where the sufficiency implication ("not neither") is simply the main asserted intent, and the exclusivity ("not both") is a purported scalar implicature, hence also an intent (i.e., meant):

(2)   John was at the party,   or Mary.
     L*H   H%   H*L   L%

The following data corroborate the purported contrast in (non-)at-issueness between (1)/(2):

(3)   A: Was John at the party, or Mary?

     B: a. (?) Yes, John or Mary. / (?) No, neither was there.
               b. (?) Yes, not both.   / (?) No, both were there.

(4)   A: John was at the party, or Mary.

     B: a.   Yes, John or Mary. /   No, neither was there.
               b.   Yes, not both.   /   No, both were there.

The judgments in (3) are in line with Roelofsen & Farkas, 2015 (their (16)). The judgments in (4), in particular (4b), align with experimental results by Destruel et al. (2015), who find that purported scalar implicatures are preferably contradicted by "no". To explain this they assume that "yes" and "no" affirm or deny only *at-issue* material, i.e., intents, not mere implications/presuppositions (see Goodhue & Wagner 2016 for a compatible account).

In the full paper we give a uniform account of the exclusivity/sufficiency implications of questions and assertions (building on Biezma & Rawlins 2012; Westera 2014); here space permits only an explanation of the difference in (non-)at-issueness of these implications. Our explanation for the case of sufficiency is relatively simple. We assume that, non-controversially, questions lack the primary communicative intention to inform that assertions have – current semantic theories of questions deliver this in a variety of ways. It follows that the sufficiency cannot be an intent in (1) (intuitively: if so then the speaker should have uttered (2) instead). A typical reason for not intending to convey what is implied, like the sufficiency in (1), is that the information is already common ground (e.g., Groenendijk & Roelofsen 2009).

In order to explain the contrast in (non-)at-issueness of the exclusivity implication, we assume that, again non-controversially, questions serve primarily to introduce new goals to the conversation, whereas assertions address prior (though potentially accommodated) goals. Following Horn (1989; his *asymmetry thesis*) we assume that negative information, hence exclusivity ("not both"), tends to be relevant not for its own sake, but only for conversation-internal reasons, namely to prune unachievable goals from the agenda. Since (2) is an assertion, it serves to address prior goals, hence its exclusivity implication may serve the pruning of goals, thus be relevant and be an intent. In contrast, (1) introduces new goals, hence there is no need for pruning a prior goal set, and the exclusivity cannot be an intent.

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